


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CIA/SAVA /WVIND 700228



WEEKLY VIETNAM INDICATORS

Week Ending 28 February 1970


NSA Declassification/Release Instructions on File.

For the President Only


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SOUTH VIETNAM WEEKLY INDICATORS



1968-1970

weekly average
for each month



OCTOBER 1969 - FEBRUARY 1970

weekly data as reported, Dec-Jan-Feb
weekly average per month, Oct-Nov



US BATTLE DEATHS rose sharply to 125 from last week's 83.





SOUTH VIETNAMESE BATTLE DEATHS increases slightly to 243 over last week's 225. The official total will change as late reports are received and will be lower than figures released to the press by the GVN.





INFILTRATORS DETECTED IN PIPELINE numbered more than 3,900; these, plus the acceptance of three "gap-fills" raised the estimate for the week to over 4,600. Some 43,000 to 44,000 infiltrators have now entered the pipeline since 23 October.



ENEMY-INITIATED INCIDENTS climbed to 702 from last week's 575.



ENEMY KILLED IN ACTION decreased sharply to 2,009 from last week's 2,469.



SOUTH VIETNAMESE EFFECTIVENESS as measured by the percentage of enemy killed by RVN forces was 50% as compared to last week's 56%.

Statistics for the latest week shown are preliminary

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

Enemy Activity

The week's enemy activity was marked by "high points" in III and IV Corps, but these efforts were confined to stand-off attacks by fire against friendly installations and were not followed up by ground attacks. Present dispositions of enemy main force units do not suggest large-scale offensive activity in the immediate future, despite frequent references to attack plans in enemy communications.

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Additional prisoners [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] have disclosed that the U.S. Embassy and Presidential Palace have been reconnoitered for possible mortar attacks this month.

Enemy Infiltration

Infiltration continued at a high rate as eight four-digit groups were detected in North Vietnam and three in Laos during the week. Additionally, three "gap fill" groups were accepted for a total of 4,659 personnel added to the estimate, which now stands overall at some 43,000 to 44,000 personnel entering the pipeline since 23 October 1969. Fifty-nine groups have been detected in NVN, 26 in Laos, and 10 are "gap fills."

The effects of the influenza epidemic continue to cause strains on the personnel infiltration pipeline. Nearly a dozen infiltration stations in Laos have reported substantial numbers of personnel suffering from the malady. Despite the prevalence of the illness, however, the movement of supplies throughout the Panhandle has apparently not been slowed.

South Vietnam Developments

The major political event of the week was the continued unfolding of the Tran Ngoc Chau affair, which has been covered in detail in other reporting.

Recent statistical data indicates that RVN forces markedly increased their share of the combat burden in South Vietnam during 1969. The RVN effort, as measured in terms of operational results (i.e., enemy personnel eliminated, weapons captured, ammunition captured, and rice captured), in the second half of last year accounted for about 41 percent of the total allied effort, as compared with about 23 percent for the first six months of 1969. Territorial forces (Regional Forces, Popular Forces, Peoples Self Defense Forces, National Police, etc.) alone accounted for about 10 percent of the allied effort in the latter half of the year, a 100 percent increase over the preceding six months. Correspondingly, the role of U.S. forces dropped rather dramatically in the second half of CY 1969 to 44 percent of the allied effort as compared with a 70 percent share of the burden in the first half of the year.

Communist Developments

In an interview this week with Daniel De Luce of the Associated Press, Foreign Minister Trinh appears to have drawn a distinction between the terms for a standstill cease-fire and the terms for an overall settlement, though as yet we have only De Luce's preliminary reports relayed through Hanoi's censors. In these initial reports, the term "cease-fire" seems to be De Luce's, not Trinh's. De Luce says the main thrust of Trinh's comments is that such a "cease-fire agreement" must provide for a U.S. troop withdrawal and the right of the South Vietnamese to settle their own problems. However, Trinh is also reported as saying that "genuine peace" can be restored only if the U.S. meets the standard demands contained in the Communists' ten-point program, including unconditional troop withdrawal, elections and a coalition government. It is noteworthy that COSVN Resolution 9 envisioned a cease-fire situation with the GVN still intact and in control of portions of the country, and with U.S. forces still present. Like Trinh's remarks, however, Resolution 9 left unclear the precise circumstances under which a cease-fire could be negotiated.

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Meanwhile, Soviet officials in Paris reportedly told [REDACTED] that the Communists will "soon break off the talks" in an attempt to show that the U.S. is responsible for the lack of progress in Paris. This appears to be another in the recent series of Soviet ploys aimed at generating pressure for the appointment of a new permanent head of the U.S. delegation.

~~Top Secret~~